Why Can't Anyone Fix Darfur?

Following a 20-year civil war between northern and southern Sudan, citizens in the western region of the country felt that their voice was not being heard in the newly formed government. This group of people in the Darfur region has been largely underrepresented in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. Many feel the lack of representation is because the current administration favors Arabs over non-Arabs.

In 2003, two armed rebel groups (Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)) formed to “compel the government of Sudan to address underdevelopment and the political marginalization of the region.” These groups attacked government-owned property in Darfur in an attempt to make their voice heard in Khartoum. In response, the Sudanese government, led by President Omar al-Bashir, has funded militias, known as “Janjaweed” to quell the rebellion by force. However, the Janjaweed has also targeted unarmed civilians in Darfur, pillaging villages and raping and killing the people of Darfur, comprised of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes. Janjaweed militias enter a village on horseback or in pickup trucks, burning huts and homes, raping women and babies, killing men, and taking what they do not set ablaze. Those lucky enough to escape face deteriorating conditions in refugee camps along the border with Chad.

Such targeted killing of people groups for reasons of race and ethnicity can only be labeled as genocide, which is the term then Secretary of State Colin Powell used in September 2004. Since then, other governments have also labeled the attacks by the Janjaweed as genocide and the latest estimates detail that over 500,000 have been killed and 2.5 million displaced.

International Response (Issue Network-Part 1)

When the word ‘genocide’ is used, it is as if a trump card has been played and a response is mandated from the western world. After Colin Powell labeled the situation in Darfur as genocide, senators in the United States took up the cause of Darfur. Senators Brownback (R-KS) and Hyde (R-IL) introduced the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act in 2005, which has since been passed by both houses. The legislation places sanctions and restriction on US interaction with the current Sudanese government.

A 7,000-strong force of African Union peacekeepers had been deployed to Sudan to keep the peace, but was terribly under-funded. Lacking supplies and permission to combat marauding Janjaweed forces, the AU troops could do very little (their tour of duty expired on September 30, 2006). Therefore, the genocide continued. Currently, a United Nations peacekeeping force is being considered, although current provisions require that the approval of the Sudanese government must be obtained before the UN can enter Sudan.

Complexities Preventing a Response (Issue Network-Part 2)

The gravity of genocides is such that usually, an immediate response is mandated. However, a history of genocides shows us that uninvolved countries are very slow to act. It was 8 years and an attack on Pearl Harbor before the United States sought to defeat Hitler. Rwanda literally seemed to occur overnight, with nearly a million people killed in less than 100 days. Such rapidity prevented western bureaucracies from acting.

In response to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, current US President George W. Bush wrote in the margins of a report about Rwanda, “Not on my watch.” Many advocates have taken these words as a rallying cry to call the President Bush and his administration to task for not acting to stop a now 3-year old genocide in Sudan.

However, such an outlook presupposes a certain response. By targeting a message towards the White House, it is assumed that the executive branch is the one to make the decision on how to act. It is assumed that the president can and should authorize some sort of military action. However, this highlights just one of many complications with many current beliefs on how to end the genocide in Darfur:

Wrong Solution #1: The United States should use military force to stop the Janjaweed from killing.

Why This is Wrong: Without considering the current over-extension of American troops elsewhere, white troops setting foot on African soil is a solution full of taboos. While many Darfurians would love to see an F-15 with an American flag on the tail fly overhead, images of white soldiers killing black Africans is not one that will play well on the nightly news. Also, this solution does not get at the root cause of the genocide and also does not address the reason for the 2003 uprising, that western non-Arab Sudanese want more representation in Khartoum. This proposed solution and its impossibility will be more detailed below.

Wrong Solution #2: Allow the AU force to possess and use weapons when Janjaweed armies attack villages or camps.

Why This is Wrong: Because the African Union and its troops are comprised of several African nations, setting the precedent of combat will not sit well for future AU endeavors. Many African nations remain deeply territorial and have long and deep memories. Thus, if a small Nigerian force were to open fire in Sudan, were Sudanese troops ever to be deployed to Nigeria, similar tactics may be used in return, warranted or not.

Wrong Solution #3: The Chinese should lobby President al-Bashir and others in Khartoum to stop funding the Janjaweed or else they will buy their oil elsewhere.

Why This is Wrong: The Chinese are highly unlikely to stop being the largest consumer of Sudanese oil on account of the oil markets continuing to be highly competitive, considering most oil producing nations are in or near conflict zones around the world. Global geopolitics is far too complicated, and China’s need for oil too great to make this suggestion a possibility.

Wrong Solution #4: Remove President Omar al-Bashir by force.

Why This is Wrong: Who will remove al-Bashir? We have already discussed the messiness of American troops unilaterally in Sudan. A non-Western NATO force is ideal, but the possibility of this happening is remote as NATO is hamstrung by its current internal politics and funding.

As one can see, the current political and economic ramifications to traditional or seemingly obvious solutions are myriad. Therefore, new solutions are needed to bring an end to “the worst humanitarian crisis of our time.”

Current Advocacy Strategies

One nonprofit to have formed in the wake of this genocide is the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC). A coalition of various organizations committed to ending the genocide in Darfur, the group maintains a very active web presence (SaveDarfur.org) and seeks to mobilize individuals around the world, especially in the US.

After a successful “Million Voices for Darfur” campaign, in which they sought to collect 1,000,000 signatures to President Bush begging for his attention to and action on the conflict, the Web site is currently seeking to repeat the mobilization in regards to a UN peacekeeping force. The goal again is to mobilize individuals to pressure governmental bodies to address the genocide in the ways unique to each organization.

For example, President Bush was targeted to allocate more funds towards relief efforts and authorize other resources to perhaps broker a peace deal. With the United Nations as a new target, the coalition requests that the international body do four things:

1. Push for immediate deployment of the mandated UN force
2. Strengthen AU forces until the UN arrives
3. Implement a “fair and lasting” peace agreement
4. Increase humanitarian aid

Similar to the Million Voices approach, the coalition is attempting to raise awareness as they actively lobby a decision maker. Within the RODEO (Recognition, Options, Decision, Execution, Outcomes) framework, the SDC operates mainly in the realm of recognition. Their primary tactic is to raise awareness among individuals around the globe, compelling them to actively contact and persuade other decision makers to act. Using various public relations campaigns, replete with images of refugees and alarming statistics, the SDC is trying to arouse the great sleeping dog that is the American public. The SDC believes that if thousands of voices shout loudly enough in a certain direction, key decision makers can be persuaded to do what they can to end the genocide.

A positive effect of the detailed approach used by the SDC is that its petitions outline specific options (see list of 4 UN options above). By including short recommended courses of action, the SDC moves from recognition to options within RODEO. Presenting decision makers with possible choices enables the message to get to the target more simply and directly, which will hopefully elicit a positive response.

However, the SDC’s effectiveness stops here in the RODEO model. Because it cannot make or execute any of the options it recommends, it can only serve in the role of advocate. None of the proposed options to the UN can be implemented by any organizational member of the SDC. Therefore, it only serves to provide recognition to the general public and options to decision makers. Its hope is that once a decision is made, their options that came from an increased recognition will be duly executed with positive outcomes.

In a similar vein, Nicolas Kristof, an opinion columnist for the New York Times, has used his platform in one of the most widely read newspapers in the world to advocate for solutions to the Darfur conflict. Playing the role of both media and advocate, Kristof has studied the conflict and traveled to Chad and Sudan to meet victims firsthand. He writes every Sunday and Tuesday for the Times.

Mr. Kristof also operates largely in the realm of recognition. With such a powerful platform, and greater readership than SaveDarfur.org, he seeks to mobilize the sleeping dog of the middle to upper class educated population. Kristof seeks to futher mobilize educated and socially aware audiences when he travels to speak about Darfur at top-tier universities.

Usually, Kristof advocates for options and sometimes addresses decision makers, in the way that columnists usually do, as both a literary technique and a way to convey information and other thematic elements. But, again, Kristof cannot make decisions or execute his own options. He calls to task and holds accountable those he thinks can, however, as he did with the Bush administration in 2005. He counted the days it took from the time President Bush agreed with Colin Powell’s assessment that the conflict in Darfur was indeed genocide until the administration took some sort of action on that admission.

Because two of the most vocal advocates must stop at the decision stage, we must now look at the assumed map of the field given this advocacy strategy. While the role of most advocates does in fact stop at the decision stage, why is it that no decision has been made? Why, in nearly four years, have none of the assumed decision makers made a decision that will lead to the termination of the Darfur genocide?

Map of the Field (With US as Chief Decision Maker)

By assuming that the Bush administration is the chief decision maker, the map of the field of this issue network looks like the following:

• Chief decision maker: President Bush can authorize money or troops to Darfur to stop fighting and attacks by the Janjaweed.
• Executive agencies that can affect or pressure the decision maker: Elected senators or legislators can propose and pass legislation suggesting a course of action for the United States to take to end the conflict.
• Election related entities: While there is no PAC directly related to Darfur, the issue of the genocide has NOT been one that is used at election time (in 2004 for President or in 2006 for midterm elections), namely because most everyone will agree THAT genocide is bad; the difference is in HOW to end it. However, unlike Iraq, gay marriage and other domestic issues garnering more attention, very little has been said or done regarding Darfur in relation to elections.
• Interest groups: In the US, most interest groups are philanthropic or aid-based. Many companies and institutions have divested from Sudan, and therefore do not stand to lose financially if a US backed military force were to enter Darfur. Likewise, the business community only stands to gain from a new government in Sudan as sanctions would likely be lifted and commerce could resume if the genocide ended.
• Idea Machines: Even coalitions like the Save Darfur Coalition offer ideas to end the genocide and propose courses of action. In fact, most advocates on this issue also propose options (as discussed above). The data on casualties and refugees also is coming largely from aid organizations and NGOs.
• The public: Under this framework (one that presupposes Bush as the chief decision maker with the most power to end the genocide), the public is the sleeping dog and NEEDS to be roused (other advocacy strategies try NOT to rouse sleeping dogs). Society at large is the target for the advocacy strategies of the SDC and Nicolas Kristof, thus they must be motivated to pressure the chief decision maker.

Unfortunately, this understanding has not worked for the last four years. Therefore, it is my belief that a new strategy is needed, which completely re-maps the field. When the new field is mapped, it will be clear that a new target for advocacy is developed and a new strategy develops entirely, including the message to the American public.

Map of the Field (With Alternative Chief Decision Maker)

By stepping back from the current cycle of thought that continues to lobby the US and the UN, I have asked the question, “Who could directly end the genocide in Darfur?” Stripping away the layers, I have come up with a direct and obvious answer: those committing the genocidal acts, which in this case, are the Janjaweed soldiers. It is the Janjaweed who decide to kill everyday and thus perpetuate the genocide. By appealing to those who make the most basic decisions, a new strategy is born. With the Janjaweed as the chief decision makers, a new map looks like this:

• Chief decision maker: Individual Janjaweed soldiers and militia groups must be persuaded to not kill unarmed civilians on account of their race or ethnicity.
• Executive agencies that can affect or pressure the decision maker: Because Janjaweed soldiers are funded by the al-Bashir administration, there are no direct executive agencies that affect the Janjaweed themselves. But, there are other non-governmental groups that could help convince these soldiers, such as religious, familial, or tribal.
• Election related entities: Again, the Janjaweed are not elected, but their funding source, the al-Bashir government, is. However, given the politics and the political system of Sudan, it is unlikely that the genocide will become an election related issue in Khartoum.
• Interest groups: The interested party is the Sudanese government itself. While quelling a rebellion and possible civil war was its first concern in 2003, by killing an entire population, the government stands to retain political control and gain land possession, both of which have economic implications. Thus, it is in the interest of the Sudanese government that the genocide continues until finished. More land means more economic gain in Sudan.
• Idea Machines: Ironically enough, al-Bashir serves as his own idea machine. He gets press time when he states that the situation in Darfur is not as bad as the Western media portrays, and that only 9,000 people have died in Darfur. Such lies are delivered to the residents in and near Khartoum and elsewhere in Northern Sudan so that individual citizens who are of similar ethnicity as those in power do not act.15
• The public: Reiterating the above analysis, the public in Northern Sudan who is relatively safe is left ignorant of the truth. However, in my proposed strategy, the public who comprises the former and potential victims, the Darfurians, are those who can have a direct effect on advocating to the Janjaweed – indeed, they are essential.
• Sleeping dogs: Because al-Bashir has been actively funding the Janjaweed, he cannot be classified as a sleeping dog, except for the possibility of him funding and enlisting more soldiers, which is a possibility given my recommendation. Like the strategies of the SDC and Kristof, the target can be considered a sleeping dog, as I am trying to rouse them to act in ways they are not currently doing. Also key to my strategy is a third sleeping dog: former Janjaweed who no longer need to kill for their livelihood.

New Course

Advocacy is the communication of a particular message to an intended target in an attempt to change the behavior of that target. To summarize, the Darfur advocacy up until now, the message has been as follows:

The target has been the general public with the message of the reality of the Darfur crisis in the hopes that more advocates will be created who will tell their government of the reality of the Darfur crisis in the hopes these governments will then use their unique powers to pressure Khartoum to stop ordering Janjaweed militias to kill Darfurians.

Thus, the advocacy strategy has been one of mobilizing more advocates. The justification has been that if enough people care, then they will leverage whatever political and economic capital they have to change the behavior of the government, so that these governments will put pressure on the government in Khartoum, who many hold responsible for the perpetration of the genocide.

By asking ourselves whose behavior needs to change in order to stop the genocide, we arrive at the obvious conclusion that those who have direct (hands-on) responsibility for the genocide, the Janjaweed, can have the clearest impact in hastening its end.

Gerry Mackie highlights the methods used by Tostan to end female genital cutting (FGC) in Senegal. Taking a page out of his playbook will help us design our appeal to the Janjaweed. In his article from 2000 titled "Female Genital Cutting: The Beginning of the End," Mackie details an approach used by Tostan to eradicate the practice of female cutting in Senegal in the 1990's. The approach also helped to end foot binding in much of China. By appealing directly to those perpetrating the offense, a new course was forged among what seemed like uncommon and unlikely alliances. In as little as a generation, the practice was nearly eradicated from certain tribes in this African nation.

In both cultures, the abusive practice had been linked to deeply held cultural beliefs and a economic viability. With two seemingly insurmountable obstacles, how were locals able to be convinced to end a practice that was hundreds of years old?

A three-pronged approach of education, discussion and commitment helped end the abuse and show an alternative way for those cutting and those victimized. Because cutting is directly linked to marriageability in many cultures, a village would have to make a written commitment to not cut their daughters and to encourage their sons to marry uncut women. Once this happened for as little a generation, the tide had turned and the method spread to other villages.

Similarly, for Darfur, a three-pronged approach is needed to convince soldiers that what they are doing is wrong. Once education of the Janjaweed happens, then a small group can join together to put down their guns and pick up the proverbial olive branch of peace.

The commitment that needs to be made is one of peace out of the necessity for survival and the education campaign can be languaged and launched in a similar fashion to the one used in Senegal. This appeal will be based on a shared humanity that is just below the surface of all human conflict.

The Janjaweed militias kill for several reasons, but ultimately, they work for the same reasons most of us work: survival. Without work, most of us have would have no money, which we use to by the necessities of life, such as shelter, food, clothing and other basic needs. Part of Janjaweed payment, however, is the loot they get from raiding a village. When they enter a certain part of Darfur and raze the community, the animals, food, and other items they glean from the abandoned tents become theirs to barter with or sell at their leisure.

Of course, part of the reason they kill and rape (as opposed to just stealing) has to do with a lack of education regarding their fellow countrypersons. Believing propaganda from the government, these marauders feel that Darfurians are less than human at worst, and simply inferior at best. Thus, it is easy to kill someone when you feel as if they do not deserve to live. Their misunderstanding of their shared commonality contributes to the continuation of the genocide. Therefore, by addressing the shared humanity between the perpetrators and the victims, we can hope to build a bridge toward the cessation of the killing.

By categorizing the traits of their specific human condition, both the Janjaweed and the citizens of Dafur all have a need for the following:

• Survival
• Land
• Governance
• Race
• Religion
• Humanity
• Suffering

When we examine these for each, we get what seems like two very different pictures:

Survival:

• The Darfurians stay in camps, flee the militia attacks, and live in refugee camps for this reason
• The Janjaweed kill, attack and destroy for this reason, as it is how they earn income and what they believe

Land:

• The Darfurians live in Western and Southern Sudan
• The Janjaweed live in Eastern and Northern Sudan

Governance:

• The Darfurians want a fair representation and an equal say in those who govern them
• The Janjaweed obey the commands of a dictator/president

Race:

• The Darfurians are dark skinned Africans
• The Janjaweed are light skinned Africans

There are shared commonalities in each of these. The shared qualities of each category are greatest with the need for survival, and then the overlap decreases as we work our way down to race. But, where there is overlap, there is a message.
Similarly, below the surface are categories that also provide the overlap needed to send a message upon which community building can begin:

Race:

• The Darfurians are dark skinned Africans
• The Janjaweed are light skinned Africans

Religion:

• The Darfurians are African Muslims and Christians
• The Janjaweed are Arab Muslims

Humanity:

• The Darfurians are people in the midst of the human condition
• The Janjaweed are people in the midst of the human condition

Suffering:

• The Darfurians experience victimization at the hands of the Janjaweed
• The Janjaweed experience victimization at the hands of Khartoum

As you can see, below the surface, the commonalities are much easier to find. Beginning with an appeal to the shared humanity and suffering of each group will lead towards an acknowledgement of that which is in common above the surface, such as the origin of their races, their shared hope for Sudan and Africa, their need for representative government, and their universal quest for survival.

Below the surface, commonality is greatest at the bottom, in terms of suffering and decreases as we move towards race again. Imagine two hourglasses for each group, where 'survival' is at the top and 'suffering' at the bottom. In the middle, where the sand exits the top, there is a line, which will serve as 'the surface.' When we push each group's hourglass towards one another, the top and bottom overlap simultaneously and so fourth until both hourglasses are juxtaposed, one on top of the other. The more they are pushed closer, the more the groups share, and the deeper the message can get.

Therefore, the initial message has to stress the shared need for survival based on the human condition of suffering. When the Janjaweed recognize this basic right of the Darfurians, and the fact that this need is shared, new dreams can emerge wherein the two work together to ensure the survival of the other. Idealistically, the Janjaweed protect a village in exchange for food, education, and clothing. Living together, the group bridge the other gaps (even race) until the community thrives on trust built from shared needs.

Now that we've defined our message of overlap and commonality, we must find someone who will bring the message to the Janjaweed soldiers. Who is best equipped to deliver this message? Who can accurately bring the good news that there is hope in a shared suffering?

In Gerry Mackie's description of Tostan, the message is initially delivered by Western 'outsiders.' However, allies are quickly formed so that the message is not seen as being exclusively delivered by foreigners 'who think they know better.' Understandably, any such attitude would lead to the messengers being branded as irrelevant and the message itself would fall on deaf ears.

However, due to the overlap in the message, the Darfurians and former Janjaweed should be the ones to bring the message to the Janjaweed. Their shared suffering allows them to deliver the message with integrity. They have authority due to their victimization and their privilege as 'insiders,' even though the Janjaweed views their position as inferior.

The plan? Upon impending attack, a village should formally surrender, announcing that they want to meet the demands of the soldiers as best they can. They must appeal on the grounds that they know why they soldiers attack, and that there are common threads upon which a bridge can be built to lay foundations for a healthy future together.

While such an idea seems ludicrously naïve, there is no doubt that in some cases there will be more killings, and the vulnerability of the Darfurians will be taken advantage of. Thus, it is recommended that the first attempt at this be done with a small group (five or less) of attacking Janjaweed (as opposed to a band of twenty or more).

Once an envoy from the village has appealed to the soldiers, a bond will be formed on their shared commonality and a peaceful future can begin. This approach will be combined with a public awareness and education campaign aimed at the Janjaweed soldiers.

Now, who will bring the message to the Darfurians so that they know how to speak with the Janjaweed?

Again, following Tostan’s method, an educational campaign must be done initially so that people can find hope in the message and its delivery. The campaign in Darfur will mirror that in Senegal that ended female genital cutting. Once Darfurians have been trained, they will be able to not only communicate effectively with the Janjaweed; they will be prepared to ultimately lead their own autonomous communities and governments. Aid organizations and NGOs operating in Darfur and Chad can bring the initial message of hope for the forging of a new community via education, as most Darfurian victims wish to carry on with their education even though they are forced to live in an IDP (internally displaced person) camp.

Another method is for those bringing aid within Darfur to carry this message. Many aid organizations and individuals have chosen to remain in Darfur despite the inherent risks. Some rebuild wells, some bring medical care, and others drop food. These groups and individuals are welcome and can bring the message as a trusted outsider.

A third, nearly independent way to attempt to build this new society is to get former Janjaweed soldiers and current victims to build a new village together on empty or barren land elsewhere in Sudan. While many plots now go unoccupied, it is therefore possible to find empty space to build a new community, with housing, schooling and viable enterprise. As soldiers leave the Janjaweed army for personal or medical reasons, they would be allowed to assimilate into this new community, which would serve as a beacon to current soldiers. When word spreads that a new community exists in which no one needs to fight to live, other soldiers may be more willing to drop their guns and seek to peacefully coexist with others they had previously seen as different, if they, too, could have meaningful life’s work.

Summary

Until now, the current advocacy strategy has been aimed at rousing the sleeping dog that is the general public living in the developed world. By arousing this dog, it is hoped that pressure will be put upon the US and the UN to intervene in Darfur and use their economic and military clout to sever the connection between the current Sudanese government and its funding of the Janjaweed militias.

While successful at raising awareness, the genocide continues, largely because those with the most influence on ending the conflict has not been targeted. As such, the Janjaweed militia, if targeted with the right message, could be compelled to cease killing and instead motivated to build lasting and peaceful communities.